



**Current changes of environment surrounding
security export control**

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Background

- Project Alpha was created at King's College London with the goal of engaging the private sector in preventing illicit trade.
- The premise of the project was that enterprise is the front line of defence but must be effectively engaged
- Project Alpha continues to do a great deal of industry outreach and engagement
- Project's work has expanded to address other gaps and challenges in the non-proliferation regime

Project Alpha Today

Academic project that works to understand and counter illicit, proliferation-related trade. This involves three strands of work:

1. Understanding illicit trade through:

- Researching and publishing examples of illicit trade through the Alpha case studies series
- Development of “Alphanonpro” open source trade information platform

2. Improving the implementation of trade controls in order to counter illicit trade. Involves:

- Implementing the EU outreach program on dual-use goods, which involves capacity building in up to 30 countries outside of Europe
- Elearning for companies in 27 languages / countries in partnership with Content Enablers

3. Informing efforts to optimise the non-proliferation regime

Alpha In Depth – the concept

- Comprehensive studies of issues of particular interest to policymakers
- Reports now available on Iran’s missile industry, the DPRK’s proliferation apparatus, and Pakistan’s strategic nuclear and missile industries
- Reports planned on India’s nuclear/missile programmes and Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programmes




Iran's Missile Industry: key findings

- More than 20 known subsidiaries of Iran's key missile development and production agency, the Aerospace Industries Organisation of Iran – which is itself still subject to UN Security Council sanctions – do not appear on sanctions and watch-lists
- Range of facilities involved in missile-related development and production goes far beyond those listed in previous studies – we have geo-located more than 100 sites using open source fusion techniques
- Key countries of origin for technology bound for Iranian missile programme are China, DPRK, Germany, Russia and the US
- Key procurement transit points are China, Turkey and the UAE

DPRK proliferation apparatus: key findings

- North Korea's illicit networks are global in scope. All countries are at risk of being used by DPRK networks for illicit procurement, proliferation and luxury goods smuggling.
- UN-sanctioned DPRK entities are marketing goods from DPRK embassies in locations including Moscow and Beijing
- DPRK proliferation and procurement apparatus is complex, but can be dissected using open source information.
- Huge network of North Korean Entities operating in China



Working together to counter proliferation

- Proliferation is not a new challenge. We need to be smarter about how we address it
- In addition to political commitment, capacity building and information gathering/sharing key
- Civil society/ academic has a useful role to play in both
- Only through cooperation can we finally get to grips with the problem of proliferation



THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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